After years of declining membership, and in the wake of a general election in which it recorded its lowest share of the popular vote since 1983, the Labour party is again attempting to attract new members. This is not, of course, the first time that Labour has attempted to re-create a massmembership. New Labour deployed many of the same techniques between 1994 and 1997. This article both assesses the extent of the current membership crisis and explores that earlier experience. We outline the basis of Tony Blair's initiative in recruiting new members during the 1990s and detail the extent of the decline in membership after 1997. We examine the state of the party's membership currently and go on to consider the lessons for the party today both of New Labour's initial success in attracting new members and of its ultimate failure to retain them.
I Introduction
In the decline was all the more noteworthy, of course, because back in the mid-1990s developing a mass membership base was taken to be a defining feature of New Labour, one that was intimately associated with Tony Blair's leadership of the party and with techniques pioneered in Sedgefield, his parliamentary constituency in the North-East of England. Between 1994 and 1997 membership had increased spectacularly, reaching just over four hundred thousand, but thereafter the party had proved unable to hold onto its membership. Moreover, the increase since May 2010 does not appear to have been sustained. By December 2011, the party stated that membership had fallen slightly to 193,300. Reports of the number of ballots distributed for internal party elections in the summer of 2012 indicate a much more substantial decline of nearly 10 per cent in around six months (Black, 2012) .
In this article we examine the state of Labour's membership. It is a commonplace observation in the press and in academic research that, given the years of decline and notwithstanding the recent rise, Page | 2 it is in crisis. We assess the extent of that crisis. Unlike previous scholarship by Patrick Seyd and Paul Whiteley detailing the state of the party's grassroots (the classic texts are 1992 and 2002), we do not have access to data concerning the activism of members. Instead we draw on four distinct sources of information to chart developments in the membership of the party. First, we deploy the extraordinarily detailed breakdown of voting by individual party members in the 2010 Labour party leadership election to consider the distribution and size of membership on a constituency by constituency basis in September 2010 . This data has the advantage that, not being based on a survey, they offer a revealing picture of the precise state of Labour's grassroots. Second, using the party's annual report, we extract information to chart the flow of membership over the last twenty years. Where possible we examine the turnover, taking account not just of those joining but of those leaving . It is well established that party-generated figures may exaggerate membership levels (see Mair and van Biezen, 2001, 6-7; and Scarrow, 2000, 85, 88-89) . By charting the flow of members across years, at the same time as noting changes to the means of calculation, we hope to minimise this risk. Third, we draw on data discussed by the party's National Executive Committee (as documented in the form of blogs) to examine the fluctuations in membership. A fourth strand of data in the form of press reports allows us to look at the rise and fall of party membership in two constituencies, Sedgefield and Dunfermline East. Manifestly, both blogs and press reports are potentially problematic as sources. Nevertheless, these two CLPs are especially important to any discussion because they were held up as stories of model success -the parliamentary seats of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown, two key architects of developing Labour into a mass membership organisation during the mid-1990s. The extent of press coverage of the Sedgefield model especially provides us with an opportunity to assess the initiative.
Drawing on these distinct sources of data, we address a number of related issues concerning the state of Labour party membership and its apparent recovery since May 2010. We ask what was the Page | 3 extent of the fall in grassroots' numbers after the 1997 election victory? Where possible, we address potential reasons for the collapse in the party's membership. We detail the state of Labour membership at the time of the 2010 leadership contest and we consider what the data reveals about the party's members in contrast to earlier work by, among others, Seyd and Whiteley. In our conclusion we discuss the importance for Labour politics of these developments, noting a number of recurring problems that the party has encountered. In our analysis, we do not offer a specific hypothesis or suggest a single causal relationship that might explain the fall in membership. Rather, our aim is to take the detailed evidence about membership changes and consider what conclusions might be generated.
In themselves, these issues are of significance, but there is, of course, a wider dimension to this analysis. Labour is not alone as a party in experiencing declining levels of membership. Over several decades, party membership has fallen across most European polities (see Scarrow, 2000; Seyd and Whiteley, 2004, 356; and Webb, 2002, 441) . More than a decade ago, Peter Mair and Ingrid van Biezen (2001) charted the absolute drop in members, alongside the relative decline in party membership as a proportion of the electorate. A second paper, coauthored with Thomas Poguntke, confirmed the pattern, demonstrating the 'staggering' extent of the loss (van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012, 33) . But the British case was especially precipitous as all three major parties lost members (Marshall, 2009 ). Between 1983 and 2008 , the proportion of the electorate that was a member of these parties fell from 3.8 per cent to 1.2 per cent (Marshall, 2009, 6; Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012, 28, 32) . Only Slovakia and the Czech Republic indicated a greater decline in membership. By that date, only Poland and Latvia revealed a worse figure for party political engagement. In another analysis, the United Kingdom offered the lowest level of political participation (Scarrow and Gezgor, 2010, 825) . Such statistics are all the more striking given that the Labour's lost grassroots Page | 4 British decline comes in the face of a sustained initiative by Labour to regenerate its grassroots in the mid-1990s.
Academics do not agree on quite why party membership has experienced such trouble. Comparative scholars note variation in terms of the historical entrenchment of a democracy and the size of a polity (Mair and van Biezen, 2001, 9-10; and van Biezen, Mair and Poguntke, 2012, 36) . Through their extensive surveys, Seyd and Whiteley (see, for example, 2004) came to emphasise choice based factors focused around the incentives that shaped an individual's decision to participate. They downplayed structural factors such as societal trends. In more recent work, Paul Whiteley (2010) has distinguished between two broad perspectives (see also Mair and van Biezen, 2001, 14) . Under the first approach, parties have been undermined by state interventions. Public authorities have undertaken more and more tasks traditionally the responsibility of parties. As a result, increasingly redundant, political activists have ceased to participate. Under such 'state capture', there is no demand for large memberships. In the case of Britain, a strong statement is to be found in Mair's analysis of New Labour as 'partyless democracy' (Mair, 2000 ; see also Mair, 1997) . Under the second approach, parties have been undermined by more general changes to civil society that have shaped the supply of members. Such changes might include the rise of competing organisations, increased pressure on leisure time, and the changed social backgrounds of potential participants. Given the range of alternatives, there is less incentive for individuals to join a party. In this perspective, declining participation is reflective of a more general decline in social capital (the classic statement of this approach is, of course, Putnam, 2001 ). In a cross national survey, Whiteley's conclusion indicated support for the former explanation. It is worth emphasising that, in this paper, our aim is not to test the conclusions of this comparative literature. Rather it is to use the available data to illuminate the case of the Labour party. Nevertheless, our analysis allows us to offer some reflections on these wider perspectives and we do address issues relevant to comparative discussion in our Page | 5 conclusion. In the next section we discuss the foundation of the Sedgefield model of mass membership.
II The 'Sedgefield model': The importance of mass membership in New Labour
Even before becoming party leader in July 1994, Tony Blair was closely associated with the need to increase the size of Labour's local membership. In the early 1990s, dissatisfied with the extent of modernisation strategies elsewhere in the party, he helped to pioneer a number of schemes to boost recruitment in his Sedgefield constituency (see Rentoul 1995, 312-313; and Smyth 1996) . An increased membership, one that was in some generalised sense different to past memberships, was a fundamental way of revitalising Labour. Blair told the BBC's On the Record in January 1993, 'What I want to see is the Labour party pushing itself outwards, getting back in its local community, being the party that represents people within that community' (BBC On The Record 1993a). He continued 'it is so important that we go in a different direction on membership', holding up Sedgefield as an exemplar of what could be achieved. For Blair, getting people to join was not just a statistical exercise, it was a means of recasting the party altogether. He told Brian Walden in September 1993, 'This mass membership -extending the membership of the party -that's not a glorified recruitment drive to me, it's about transforming the way the Labour party works and it operates and it thinks… We are changing the whole culture of the party and the way it works' (Walden 1993 ; see also Timmins 1992) . The development of a mass party was linked to reforms to Labour's structure, in particular the establishment of one member, one vote, for internal posts and leadership election contests. The measure, it was argued, empowered members and encouraged participation.
In a 1999 pamphlet for Progress, an internal group within Labour, Phil Wilson outlined the Sedgefield model in detail emphasising a focus on 'traditional hard working communities' (Wilson 1999, 5) . He Page | 6 noted, 'Tony Blair believed that the party had to become less introspective and more communityfocused, with a mass membership making it more representative' (Wilson 1999, 6) . For Blair, having a mass membership was a way of locating the party in the community and avoiding the extremism of the past which could be blamed, in part at any rate, on unrepresentative activists taking control. He concluded, 'We have to represent communities and have roots in them' (Hetherington 1994, 8) . It was an important lesson to learn: Blair argued, 'There is a slight tendency to take people's votes for granted, to think an area like this [Sedgefield] is solid Labour.' Sedgefield offered members the opportunity to pay what they could afford and replaced some party meetings with social occasions.
When Blair was filmed eating a burger at a barbecue, one journalist commented 'the scene gave a whole new meaning to the idea of a political party and was meant to ' (Aitken 1994, 27 ). Wilson made the point: 'Political debate, socials and even barbecues were the order of the day' (Wilson 1999, 8) .
Blair was not alone in supporting such an initiative. An eloquent statement of the possibilities of developing a mass membership base was provided by Gordon Brown in a 1993 pamphlet, Making Mass Membership Work. This built on earlier work he had done for the Tribune group of MPs which had emphasised recruiting trade union levy payers -members of unions affiliated to Labour -into formal membership: 'for this army of supporters now waiting in the wings', he claimed, 'individual membership should be inexpensive to buy and attractive to hold' (Brown 1987) . In the event the attempt to enrol trade unionists proved disappointing. In four years only 23,000 levy payers joined the party (Russell 2005, 218) . By 1993, Brown was focusing on an active, directed recruitment strategy in the community. People should be asked to pay what they could afford (a central theme in Sedgefield's experience) with local parties making up shortfalls through fundraising. He was blunt about the party's existing culture: 'We also need to address the fact that the style of our meetings has been a turn off for many members' (Brown 1993, 6) . Labour needed to locate itself within the Page | 7 locality -'at the centre of community life' and look out for 'local issues to highlight' (Brown 1993, 7) .
Members would be 'two way ambassadors for Labour' as 'our party will reflect the communities that its members live in' and he promised 'an explosion of political involvement and community activity' (Brown 1993, 8-9) . Wilson argued that local policy forums might involve community groups (Wilson 1999, 17) . Brown subsequently picked up on this theme after he became leader of the party in 2007 in a Progress pamphlet he wrote: 'every local party should involve local organisations and individuals with our shared values in our debates' (Brown 2007, 8) . Pithers 1993, 6;  see also Webster 1991; and Rentoul 1995, 313) . Wilson too claimed that people were waiting to be asked to join (Wilson 1999, 8) . In his pamphlet Brown maintained that the record in Dunfermline destroyed 'the idea that mass membership is a romantic illusion' (Brown 1993, 3) . Years later Brown told a journalist, 'I always thought that the party was too narrow in its membership, and its link with the communities it served. I thought that contributed to many of our problems, that we were talking to ourselves, rather than relating to the country' (Hughes 1998, 6 ).
Accordingly, a mass party membership, one that was based in the community, was for Blair and Brown a central feature of New Labour. Wilson asserted, 'The distinction between community and the Labour party was beginning to dissolve' (Wilson 1999, 9) . In his introduction to Wilson's pamphlet, Blair was indignant in rejecting the charge that 'New Labour is somehow a recent invention of a metropolitan elite, foisted on an unwilling party.' Elsewhere he was equally categorical: 'I see the Labour party here [Sedgefield] as the model of what the Labour party (nationally) should be' (quoted by Smyth 1996, 63) . Rentoul (1995, 312) noted, 'There is a strong urge to be sceptical about the claims made for the Sedgefield Labour Party' but he concluded that it was 'a genuine success story'. As James Purnell (2012, 94) Most importantly of all perhaps, Seyd and Whiteley offered a persuasive and rigorous model, one at odds with the prevailing academic orthodoxy, which suggested that members helped to generate electoral support (see also Whiteley and Seyd 1992) . The implication of such a conclusion was straightforward. After four successive general election defeats between 1979 and 1992, if Labour wanted to win office again, it needed to expand its membership base considerably (Seyd 1993, 100) .
Such a claim was not lost on the media where Seyd and Whiteley's research was frequently published and discussed (see, for example, Whiteley and Seyd 2000, 21; Whiteley and Seyd 2001, 17) . In later work they demonstrated the different characteristics of those who had joined since Blair became leader of the party: younger, more likely to be male and working class, working in the private sector, not in unions, and less partisan . They went on to chart a significant decline in activism both in long term members who were less participative than they had been and in the new members who were less engaged in party activities than more established participants Whiteley and Seyd 2002) . The finding was significant. Labour hoped that its new mass membership base would generate a sustained increase in party activism and in its level of electoral support. Manifestly, the continuing lack of grassroots activism threatened such goals. Of course, the agenda established by Seyd and Whiteley stood in contrast to the comparative research, noted earlier, which highlighted the difficulties political parties had in sustaining mass membership across a number of polities (Mair and van Biezen 2001) . Following Tony Blair's election as leader in 1994 a sustained expansion of Labour's membership took place. As well as benefiting from local strategies to target members, the party allocated considerable resources to recruitment at a national level in the form of advertisements and staff. Labour also benefited from an extremely favourable political climate in which the Conservative administration was exceptionally unpopular in the opinion polls. However, one commentator claimed that the direct recruitment of members through personal contacts was the most successful method of increasing enrolment (Smyth 1996, 71) . Peter Mandelson suggested 28 per cent of new recruits came through friends (Mandelson and Liddle 1996, 220) . He commented, 'recruiting new members has been the biggest organisational priority for the party' (Mandelson and Liddle 1996, 218) .
III The rise and fall of Labour party membership
A few months before the 1997 general election, in January 1997, Labour membership passed 400,000 (Rentoul 1997, 6 ). But, far from sustaining this momentum and achieving the 500,000 plus target that had been set by Tony Blair, membership peaked soon after at around 405,000 and then started to decline (McSmith 1998, 4) . Over the next twelve years the fall was steady. It was discussed at various points by the party, including at National Executive meetings, and the role of membership was the subject of a number of initiatives during Labour's period in office: Partnership into Power, with a 'healthy party taskforce' under the MP Ian McCartney, was followed by A 21 st Century Party (Macleod 1996, 6; and Watt 1998, 15) . By the time of the latter scheme, McCartney claimed, rather optimistically given the data in table 1 below, 'In the last few years we have spectacularly reversed many years of declining membership', (Labour party 1999, 1). Elsewhere, however, he was quoted by The Times as complaining that Labour needed to find new ways to 'involve members and engage with local communities' (Baldwin and Webster 1999) . Neither scheme came up with much by way of a solution as to how to recruit and retain members. John Denham, a Labour minister admitted later that there had been 'a naïve optimism' about party membership, which was in 'a parlous state' (Denham 2003, 301) . Support for such an interpretation is to be found from Whiteley and Seyd (2002, 127 and 165) .
Looking at those who had exited the party in the late 1990s, they found them more likely to be The experience of Sedgefield and Dunfermline mirrored the decline in national party membership.
As noted above, in terms of recruiting new members during the 1990s, the two constituencies appeared to lead the way. Both were pivotal in pioneering a number of techniques to boost recruitment and in mapping out the model of a mass party. By August 1993, Sedgefield's membership was at 2,000 (Hetherington, 1994 ). Dunfermline's membership had also increased dramatically (Sherman, 1993) . Having already doubled, the constituency party set itself a goal of 1,500 by October 1993 (Jones 1993) . By the autumn of 1995, one newspaper reported that it was the fourth largest CLP in Scotland (behind three constituencies with well established social clubs;
Dawson 1995). But the success of Sedgefield and Dunfermline East was not sustained. The Guardian
reported in May 2003 that Sedgefield had lost over half its members in six years and was down to around 900. Interestingly, it stated that the £1 rate, by which members paid a token amount and had been held up as fundamental to getting people to join, had been dropped. It had proved too expensive to offset through the kind of fundraising that had attracted so much press attention in the mid-1990s (Maguire 2003, 8) . When faced with the option of paying the full amount, individuals had left the party. It was such financial logistics that were blamed for the fall in membership rather than contentious political choices on the part of the government, such as intervention in Iraq. Earlier, at the outset of the initiative to raise membership, one newspaper article had stated that Dunfermline East would be unable to make up the difference in contributions through fundraising (Sherman 1993) . A low membership fee was therefore not a viable strategy. Another report identified apathy as the 'main problem' behind falling membership in Sedgefield (Grice 1999, 3) . Elsewhere Andrew
Pierce identified a degree of disenchantment with New Labour's policies as a factor alongside a more general lack of interest (Pierce 2000) . The end result was that by the time of the 2010 Labour leadership contest the membership of both constituencies was a fraction of what it had once been.
In both cases the fall was larger than that of the party's membership as a whole. Sedgefield lost around 80 per cent of its members; Dunfermline East something like 70 per cent of its membership, being now only the 20 th largest CLP in Scotland. In July 2010, Trimdon Labour Club, one of the centrepieces of Blair's community-based party, closed as a result of lack of business (Lloyd 2010, 12) .
IV Labour party membership at the 2010 leadership contest
At the time of the 2010 Labour leadership contest, the number of party members had risen by over 20,000 from around 156,000 at the end of 2009 as individuals joined following the interest generated by the general election (some being disaffected Liberal Democrats) and by the intense battle for the party leadership (in which new recruits could vote). The total reported for 2009 was the lowest ever recorded by the party but it seems likely that membership had bottomed out in the months before the general election at an even lower figure of around 150,000, an historic low. Table 2 Nine were from London (and two others had strong links to the capital). There were no nominations from the North-East, South-West, and Wales. Five out of the six elected were either from London or (in the case of one) had been based in the capital until very recently. The sixth, Ann Black, lives in Oxford, only sixty miles from London. In November 2010 when Oona King was appointed to the Lords, she was replaced by Joanna Baxter, also from London. In 2012 the pattern was similar. Of the six successful candidates, four were from the capital (or in the case of one had a close link to it). Ann
Black was re-elected from Oxford. Peter Wheeler was elected from Salford. Seven of the thirteen unsuccessful candidates were from London.
V Members and votes
In the early 1990s, Seyd and Whiteley identified a link between Labour's individual membership and the party's general election vote (see especially Whiteley and Seyd 1992 ). There were a number of ways of exploring this link and any the correlation between the two variables was not straightforward. Causality was potentially problematic: votes might shape membership levels but, equally, both might be dependent on any one of a number of other variables such as housing, unemployment and so forth. Clearly both votes and memberships were likely to be shaped by a historical trajectory. Moreover, the exact causal relationship as to how membership might shape votes was not specified in some of the models. Nevertheless, the Seyd and Whiteley analysis, building on survey data, generated a powerful argument that in some sense members shaped Labour's vote at general elections.
Labour's lost grassroots Page | 24
In their discussion of the 1987 general election Seyd and Whiteley presented an interesting comparison between the size of individual CLPs and the party's vote that year. Their conclusion was direct: smaller CLPs were associated with Labour getting a lower share of the vote. Table 5 allows Note that 2010 n=631 due to the exclusion of the Speaker's seat. The data in Table 7 give a sense of fluctuations in the number of votes per member of the party at a general election. It is noteworthy that the two extremes -the most votes per member and the least - (Seyd and Whiteley, 2004, 357) . Provided parties offer 'a range of these incentives they can still attract members' (Seyd and Whiteley, 2004, 365) . Retaining Labour party members since 1997 has required more than incentives to the extent that the basic range of inducements remained much the same over the period. By contrast, the political context altered and members drifted away. Without rejecting motivations and party strategy, we suggest that the political environment plays a major role in shaping Labour membership fluctuations.
Does the reduction in the number of Labour members matter for the party's fortunes (see the general discussion in Scarrow, 2000; and Seyd and Whiteley, 2004) ? Members can provide significant resources to a party, most obviously in the form of financial support. They act as a pool from which office holders in the and in external party positions can be recruited party (around one member in fifteen held a party office in 2012 according to NEC, 2012) . They represent parties in the community, generating legitimacy, and they may play a part in campaigning at general and other elections. Equally though, it is arguable just how significant is the kind of decline identified in this article. Other parties too have lost members -though not proportionately as many as Labour.
Modern elections are centralised, frequently dominated by elites and by national campaigning.
Members may not be needed to provide political ballast in the way that they were in the 1990s at the launch of New Labour (in the face of more extreme activists). Scarrow and Gezgor (2010) concluded that parties may become more representative of the community as membership levels fall. In terms of broad attributes -age, race and gender -there is some evidence that Labour now confirms this trend (NEC, 2011a, 31) . In terms of political attributes, such as policy positions and ideological outlook, it seems less certain: as the evidence in this article indicates, people are less likely to leave in Labour's traditional heartland but, of course, the available data does not confirm one way or the other; and recent data suggest that the present party membership is considerably to the left of the voters the party has lost since 1997 (Kellner, 2012 At the same time, the Labour leadership has persisted in emphasising the importance of membership recruitment and a healthy grassroots, despite the failure of these repeated initiatives.
In the aftermath of the 2010 electoral defeat, it launched the 'Refounding Labour' project to energise the party and enrol new members (Labour party 2011). But many of the initiatives it emphasised to help recruitment were not new: restructured meetings, social gatherings, revised fee structures, and community links had all been features of Tony Blair's New Labour model. The experience of that earlier initiatives suggests it is unlikely that such revised incentives alone will enable parties to retain newly-joined members. Moreover, some leading figures within the party appear unwilling to acknowledge the extent of the party's grassroots crisis: James Purnell (2012, 94) claims, 'Today Labour is full of active parties (as well as a few in need of defibrillators).' The data marshalled here suggests such an attitude to be complacent.
What does this discussion indicate more generally concerning party membership? The comparative literature has done a good job in terms of tracking the variations in membership levels. However, we note a significant general issue arising from these analyses. Have authors working in this field paid sufficient attention to the 'revolving door' of membership? Much of the analysis tends to conclude that there has been a straightforward decline with parties unable to recruit new members. Thus, van
Biezen et al write that parties have failed 'to recruit new members in significant numbers ' (2012, 25) .
In as much as the data allows us to judge, Labour has proved effective at recruiting new members. It has simply lost members in even greater numbers. Even in the two years following the invasion of Iraq, Labour enlisted something like 25,000 individuals (some of whom may well have left and rejoined within that period -see Black, 1-2 November 2004). The velocity with which membership has gone up and down suggests to us that in many cases members are joining, leaving and rejoining on a cyclical basis, thus generating our 'revolving door' metaphor. Accordingly, on the basis of this data, we ask whether the comparative literature has given sufficient attention to the retention of members, once they have been recruited.
Our analysis of membership trends within the Labour party, just one case to be sure, appears to be at odds with the findings generated by Paul Whiteley (2010 an approach seems to be at odds with the importance that they have also placed and continued to place on recruiting members and sustaining the party's grassroots. If Labour leaders knew a declining membership would result from party centralisation, it must be explained why they have placed so much public emphasis on attempts to revive local participation. Labour elites have not been 'relatively unconcerned' about membership levels as van Biezen et al indicate parties to be (2012, 40) . Their attempts to boost recruitment have often succeeded: they have failed in retention.
Thus the sustained attempt to revive Labour's grassroots must be seen as a failure: yet the party's current leadership continues to emphasise such a development. We conclude the political environment and contextual factors to play an important part in this pattern.
The precarious state of the party's membership overall and of many local CLPs in particular is patent.
Labour's membership currently is metropolitan and centralised in terms of its domination from suggests that Labour has not developed a coherent and sustainable model. On the basis of the data deployed here, we believe that the era of mass Labour membership is over. What will replace it remains uncertain.
